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WORLDVIEW, MEANINGFUL LEARNING AND PLURALISTIC EDUCATION: 
THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 1 
 
 
 In this paper I attempt to bridge some of the needs and realities of American multicultural 
educational paradigms in the 1990s and the often ignored educational goals, principles, and 
assumptions in a liberal democratic society that aspires to pluralism.   I will argue that (a) 
multicultural paradigms are as essential to improving "mainstream" education as they are to 
furthering the education of different cultural groups and (b) plurality should be concerned with 
meaningful learning in both a particular and a multiple perspective and worldview.  
 Using the Islamic2 worldview on life and education, I will present, as a case in point, the 
Muslims of North America (the United States. and Canada) to explicate the relation of meaning-
making to the learner's perspective.   I conclude that utilizing the learner's frame of reference in 
developing both particularity and plurality might be one of the solutions toward achieving 
pluralism as intended in the liberal democratic education.   Few strategic considerations are 
proposed to address the need of youths, parents, teachers, and experts. 
 Schools, and educational institutions in general, have the power to modify the social order; 
and they are expected to do so to perpetuate liberal democratic values.   Educational institutions, 
however, seem to have failed to reflect the multitude of worldviews and belief systems in 
education.   This is particularly evident during the last three decades, mainly because the order of 
priorities in policy making have been reversed from the philosophy of public education as 
expressed by John Dewey: 
     Under our political system, it is the right of each individual to have a voice in the 
making of social policies as, indeed, he has a vote in the determination of political affairs. 
If this be true, education is primarily a public business, and only secondarily a  
specialized vocation. . . In the conduct of the schools, it is well for the citizens to determine 
the ends proper to them, and it is their privilege to judge the efficacy of results. 3 
 But at present, even political affairs, which tend to be separated from social affairs in the 
liberal philosophy,4 are problematic.   Special interest groups outweigh the right of individuals to 
an "equal" vote just as individuals are losing their weight in the decision-making process 
regarding social affairs.   The entire framework of the democratic process in education needs to 
be reevaluated within the context of meaningful learning process.   This reevaluation calls for 
restructuring 5 the educational system by following liberal democratic principles that have no 
racial, ethnic, or religious dichotomies.6 
 
 I discuss three paradoxical issues in the way liberal public education is currently practiced.   
First, how can a pluralistic democratic society, in which educational institutions ideally should 
perpetuate liberal democratic values without one dominant view, exclude or underrepresent some 
worldviews and belief systems from the curriculum?   And how can American society continue to 
claim that liberal democratic values are the goal of education? 
  Second, how can educators, in a society that should open participation of communities in 
policy making, ignore the belief systems of some learners and still maintain that they are 
satisfying the need for pluralism and equity in instruction? 
 Third, how can an educational program be designed to facilitate communication among many 
worldviews in the context of the "mainstream" culture while program designers make little attempt 
to understand the basic philosophies underlying the different belief systems and worldviews in 
the society. 
 I propose an approach to pluralism within a liberal democracy that provides solutions for the 
mainstream educational problems and, at the same time, includes the worldviews of all groups 
without each group's becoming self-centered.   Public dissatisfaction with the mainstream 
educational system has arisen because public education has not served its primary purpose of 
helping in the evolution of social values within a liberal democracy.   Furthermore, the education 
system has failed to include the values of different groups, whether ethnic minority or moral 
majority, beyond what I call a window-dressing approach--the superficial, token representation. 
 Confusing the principles of pluralism with a superficial multi-representation, often referred to 
as multiculturalism (rightly or wrongly), defeats the basic precepts of pluralism and poses further 
contradictions within pluralism's own tenets.   Practicing multiculturalism as a means of 
safeguarding the rights of different groups without realizing that multiculturalism enhances the 
"majority's" democratic values as well is a discrepancy of the ideals and practices in a liberal 
democracy.   The basic question in multiculturalism is not merely whether or not what is taught 
reflects "accurately" the different cultural strands in our society.   Rather, the more important 
question is whether or not what is taught makes sense to the different pupils of the "mainstream," 
as well as the pupils representing all the cultural views of our society and our world. 
 
DIFFERENT FRAMES OF REFERENCE 
 As educators, we have continued to operate within the old theoretical paradigms even when 
they do not make sense in the new social context, when their plausibility for providing credible 
solutions is weakened, and when superficial remedial changes in the educational system have 
proved ineffective.   Abdelmalek Sayad states: 
     "Minority" should not be confined to mere recording of a given situation, or worse, 
to the social categorisation it entails.   In this it behaves no differently from a whole  
range of other terms (including "marginality" and "marginalization") one of whose  
most objective effects is to bring about as naively and naturally as can be (at the same 
time as putting a name to something in the usual way) what amounts to a form of social 
classification.7 
 
 Our present vision of educational structure and content cannot meet the needs of society 
because we have not made education the public business as Dewey suggested.   In Sayad's 
words, we have not concerned ourselves with the "sign of genuine change in the relationship of 
the immigration society to itself."   For example, the Muslims parents' and youths' perception of 
Islam and American culture, in general, are considered basic determinants for the adjustment 
and learning processes of these Muslims.   Equally important, an educator working in a 
community with significant Muslim populations (100,000 or more) must understand how the views 
of both parents and youth have developed and how Islamic education 8 concepts are applied in 
the new American context as perceived by these Muslims of the 1990s.   Finally, the image of the 
Muslim population--which has been to a large extent in the American mind one of 
fundamentalists and terrorists--does not remain the same, mainly because the society at large is 
constantly changing, and its image of itself is different from what it was even a decade earlier.   
This constant change in a particular group's image of itself and its representation by others, and 
in the society's own image of itself, is what I call particularity within plurality.9 
 The relationship between the practice of multiculturalism and particularism seems to be 
misunderstood and calls for some analysis.   Diane Ravitch's and Arthur Schlesinger's10 
assumption or "fear" that particularism should necessarily lead to ethnocentrism would be 
avoided if the needs of the particular group were not pushed to the periphery of the social 
structure or the margins of the educational milieu.   Sayad indicates, 
     Indeed, current usage of the term [minority] is evidence of the struggle for  
"autonomy" waged by communities who see themselves as "minorities," much as  
elsewhere the term "culture," and especially "popular culture," was used with  
different shades of meaning to symbolise a struggle that went beyond a mere  
quarrel over words (the "dispassionate" crusade for "culture").11 
 
 In presenting the case in point of North American Muslims, I shall attempt to explain the 
effect of the frame of reference on learning, group particularity, and the perception of a liberal 
democracy and plurality within the different worldviews.   This case study is intended also to 
discuss the discrepancy between the ideals and practice of liberal democratic education, such as 
limited access to policy making while claiming open participation.   In addition, curriculum 
designers and educators rarely attempt to understand the underlying assumptions of different 
worldviews and belief systems. 
 As part of a larger study, a group of seventeen Muslim youths living in the United States and 
Canada responded to the following statement: "Muslims don't drink alcohol or eat pork because. . 
. ."   Their answers varied from "because they are prohibited in the Qur'an" to "because of health 
reasons."12   Two of the respondents were a brother and sister, and their response is the focus of 
analysis here.   The nineteen-year-old brother spent most of his formative years in an Islamic 
environment and the last five years in the secular United States.   He stated: 
     In order to refrain from something, there needs to be self-discipline, and the  
inner conscious (Taqwa) is very important here.   Unless there is [inner] Taqwa 
and faith, you probably would think that nothing would be wrong [to drink]. . . . 
We should always look to the future impact of our behavior, but unless you know  
that there is something that pulls [one]back, this inner conscious, you will not  
succeed in [making] people refrain. 
 
 The sister came to the United States when she was nine years old.   She was fourteen at the 
time of the interview.   She stated: 
     They have a course in school about [alcohol and] drugs [abuse], but it is not the 
same as Islam states [about alcohol].   Here, they tell you that it could kill you, but  
Islam prohibits it [alcohol] because it is harmful, whether you drive or not, and  
also because it may lead you to other things that are prohibited. 
 
 The nineteen-year-old boy, in his answer and later on in the discussion, attempted to 
integrate three of Islam's basic principles (anyone who is drinking is prohibited from attending 
worship, alcohol obscures constructive acts, and faith is inseparable from conscious and 
constructive acts) in the context of the issue of drinking alcohol and its consequences for driving.   
He emphasized that regardless of whether refraining from alcohol was related to prayer or to 
harming oneself or others, the decision had to result from faith and the inner consciousness of 
God as the guide who provides the criteria for right and wrong.   Without faith and inner 
conscious, according to this nineteen-year-old boy, a person will not be able to make on the spot 
judgments leading to appropriate action.   Although he was thinking within the Islamic frame of 
reference and way of life and according to the Islamic belief system's central concept of Oneness 
of the Deity (Tawhid)13 as the only source of value, knowledge, and authority, he was able to 
relate this particular concept of consciousness to the general philosophy that underlies the 
alcohol and drug education curriculum--responsibility for one's action. 
 
 The fourteen-year-old, however, having spent most of her formative years in a non-Islamic 
environment, understood the rationale for not drinking alcohol within the context of the rules of 
prohibition only.   Though she was able to analyze the difference between the Islamic and the 
Western rules and rationales about drinking, she was not able to connect the Islamic prohibition 
with Islam's central concept that God is the only source of value, knowledge, and authority, as 
her brother did.   This limitation in her ability to connect between the general philosophy of the 
course on alcohol and drug abuse and that of the Islamic belief is a result of (a) her inability to 
relate the particular meaning of alcohol prohibition in Islam to its general implications even in a 
secular society, and (b) to the fluidity of the guiding criteria for constructive and responsible acts 
within the secular philosophy of education. 
 The ability to connect the central concept of the Islamic worldview with Islamic principles and 
rules will be lost in the practice of the Islamic ideology and culture within the context of the 
pluralistic secular society of North America if educators, Muslims or non-Muslims, fail to 
recognize this essential particularity of the Islamic worldview.   From its earliest period, Islam 
bore a distinct difference from its Jewish and Christian sister faiths in that the Islamic community 
was a society in which religion was integral to all areas of life: politics, law, and society.   Thus, 
the individual Muslim who lacks the ability to connect between the worldview and the principles 
and values that direct action may also become confused concerning the criteria for constructive 
and destructive acts within the Islamic frame of reference vis-á-vis the liberal democratic frame of 
reference.   This lack may eventually result in a continuous conflict between guidance from the 
Muslim home and that from the secular school, particularly if parents are not aware of or clear 
about the Western secular philosophy.   Some Muslim youth in the United States and Canada 
have already developed an identity conflict 14  and  different perception of Islam as exemplified in 
the above siblings' understanding of the prohibition of alcohol.   Barazangi (1990, 1991) suggests 
that neither the home nor the school has been able to prevent and resolve the consequent 
problems because neither is aware of the roots of the conflict. 
 
 
CONNECTING THE PARTICULAR TO THE PLURAL 
 Further analysis of Muslims' practice in the context of some paradigms of multiculturalism is 
in order to explicate the home-school conflict.   Muslims, particularly recent immigrants, attempt 
to teach their children the history of Islam and the principles of the Islamic belief system at home, 
or by sending them to weekend and/or full-time Muslim schools, thinking that by doing so they will 
preserve the next generation's ideological and cultural identity in secular North America.   
Barazangi (1988) indicates that the young generation of Muslims, even those who are attending 
full-time Muslim schools, are identifying primarily with the secular culture and only secondarily 
with their parents' social customs and sentiments that are assumed to reflect Islamic principles.   
In her attempt to lay the groundwork for community-based curriculum development and an 
integrative Islamic education program within the pluralistic, liberal democracies of the United 
States and Canada, Barazangi followed the indications of her findings--that any program on 
Islamic education should be based, first, on a dialogue between the particular cultural group (the 
Muslim community in this case) and the mainstream culture (the American and the Canadian) to 
develop deeper understanding of the Islamic perspective beyond mutual respect and 
appreciation.   Although the recommendations by Barazangi (1988, 1990 and 1991) were 
specifically for Muslims' education in North America, their implications are not limited to the 
Muslim community nor to religious communities, but to the American education process as a 
whole.   That is, the idea of teaching the history of a particular group by its members to guarantee 
the group's cultural survival is not a self-centered approach, but an essential approach to 
preserve particularity as part of the community.   However, mere teaching of history and some 
principles of the group's belief system does not automatically result in developing the particular 
worldview among the members of the next generation without understanding the underlying 
assumptions of the particular group and the larger culture. 
 
 Ravitch and Schlesinger argue that the "history taught to the children of the state must meet 
the highest standards of accuracy and integrity."   The two authors, however, "steadfastly oppose 
the politicization of history, no matter how worthy the motive" and state that "we are also united in 
our belief in a pluralistic interpretation of American history and our support for such shamefully 
neglected fields as history of women, of immigration and of minorities."15   On the other hand, their 
argument seems to limit the understanding of multiculturalism to the inclusion of the voices of 
women, of blacks and other minorities and to the broadening the perspective of teachers of 
history.   Ravitch seems to believe that such inclusion constitutes the presence of multiculturalism 
in the schools. 
 It is not clear, as some minority group would like to see happening, that the mere inclusion of 
other voices can change the "Eurocentricism" opposed by minority groups.16   It is clear, however, 
that these different voices are not being heard equitably -- to fulfill the premise that public 
education should provide access to information and conceptualization about perspectives other 
than that of the perspective of the predominant culture.   Even if different voices are included 
(whether indirectly, such as the Muslims' teaching their children the Islamic history as they know 
it, or directly, such as the inclusion of a unit on Islamic history in the social studies curriculum and 
making sure that it reflects the Muslims' perception of their own history), they will remain marginal 
as long as the worldview in which they are taught remains that of the predominant culture of 
secular Western society. 
 In addition, Ravitch and others who argue against politicizing the curriculum seem to have 
forgotten two important points.   First, the entire educational process and curricular objectives are 
based on political decisions.17   That is, the perpetuation of the governing social and political 
values of the liberal democracy in the next generation through public education is a process of 
politicizing the citizens.   Second, Americanization through public education has not been a fully 
liberal democratic process that prepares the citizens for life in a pluralistic nation, in which the 
learner preserves and treasures his or her cultural heritage as a base for identity development 
and a holistic personality.   This unrecognized aspect of "American" education is evidenced in 
Schlesinger's statement:  
     The U.S. escaped the divisiveness of a multiethnic society by the creation of a 
brand-new national identity.   The point of America was not to preserve old cultures  
but to forge a new, American culture.   The new American nationality was  
inescapably English in language, ideas and institutions.18 
 
WORLDVIEWS IN THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
 Marginalization is the concomitant problem to the window-dressing approach to 
multiculturalism in American education.   In other words, Alexis de Tocqueville's notion of 
"equality in conditions" has been driving the American educational system despite his warning 
against individualism in democratic nations.   He noted the tendency of democratic nations to 
make individuals less and less distinguishable from one another, "to reduce them to a mass of 
'sameables' under an increasingly powerful and impersonal government." 19   De Tocqueville was 
more concerned about the danger in the notion of "natural isolation" of the individual under 
conditions of equality, "an isolation which rendered him [the individual] dangerously powerless, 
although it was an isolation which the individual chose for himself."20   De Tocqueville identifies 
the central paradox, evidenced in the history of American education and in the "melting pot" 
notion, that the social conditions and psychology of an individualistic society tend to produce 
conformity at the expense of individuality.   Therefore, writes Sayad: 
     All other things being equal (as if they could be), one gets the idea that the only  
possible criteria for separateness, that is to say, self-identity, are derived from  
a few distinctive traits or speech or behavior (so-called, cultural differences) or  
from ethnic considerations.  Like various other words that confer identity, status,  
social rank, and simultaneously (merely, some would say) indicate, the term  
"minority" is not a neutral word: it serves both as a cause and a weapon. 21 
 
 The "nonassimilability" of some distinct characteristics of one group of immigrants (or of 
indigenous people) should not be cast in the classification of "ethnicity," "minority," or "religious 
fundamentalism."   These characteristics are not inherently fixed to all people of the same origin, 
nor are they static and unchangeable.   Worse yet, Sayad laments, "this kind of labeling brings 
about more separatism, that may or may not represent particularism, and further perpetuation of 
a fixed identity."22 
 Were the issue of marginalization and, hence, the struggle for legitimacy and autonomy not 
being forced on the different cultural groups, the domination of the "minority" concept would be 
diminished.   Finally, variations in observable characteristics do not necessarily represent 
variations in the underlying assumptions and worldviews that govern particular individual and/or 
group behavior. 
 
 In solving the questions that arise for Muslims in presenting their own educational values 
within the context of the Western educational systems of North America, four assumptions about 
the dominant Western worldview seem to be relevant: 
   (1) Western ideology assumes secularism--the separation of religion and government--a 
concept that is alien to Islam.   In multicultural societies, decision makers are not supposed to 
recognize one religion or belief system over another, even though their personal views and 
epistemology might be based on a particular belief system. 
   (2) God, Lord, or Creator may be considered by many Americans to be a religious entity that 
can be separated from other aspects of life and epistemological assumptions.  These 
epistemological assumptions contradict the basic Islamic assumption that God is not only the 
Creator but also the source of value, knowledge, and authority. 
   (3) The human being is the master of nature or himself and has full authority on earth to 
practice his or her functions in isolation from God.23   This idea also contradicts the basic Islamic 
proposition that the purpose of education is to understand natural laws so that the individual can 
serve as God's (Allah's) vicegerent on earth (Qur'an, 2:30). 
   (4)  Rules in Western ideology are the rules of humans (whether of the individual or the 
society); and authority is that of a human being over others, at least as practiced in institutions 
and in legislation.   Rules are drawn by policy makers on the basis of assumptions made by the 
political founders of secular institutions or by a philosophical view that ignores metaphysics and 
belief systems.24 
 In the Islamic system, humans are only executors of interrelationships based on laws stated 
in the Qur'an (1:1-7).   The basic assumptions that underlie Islamic thought and its view of human 
knowledge and morality are in sharp contrast to the dominant Western worldview.   First, human 
knowledge is the product of human rationality plus revealed knowledge; and second, human 
learning, conception, and valuing should be guided by Allah (God) as stated in the Qur'an and 
according to the laws of nature.   These two assumptions represent the basic difference between 
the religious view--in the wide sense of the word-- and the secular view with regard to the relation 
between the belief system and knowledge. 
 
CREATING MEANINGS FOR MUSLIMS  
 Ethical philosophy and the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam are used here to 
articulate the religio-moral-conceptual dimension of Islamic rationality.   The intention is to 
explicate the metaphysics and epistemology of the youth, the parent, the teacher, and the 
"expert"25  with their interpretations of Islamic principles in the context of the secular liberal 
democracy.   The question of who the experts are in curricular development of a particular 
subject matter (Islamic knowledge in this case) is at the heart of multicultural issues.   This 
question is particularly meaningful within a pluralistic curriculum.   The educational implications of 
academic and communal debates that attempt to address this question, therefore, should focus 
on practical solutions and not be a theoretical intellectual exercise.   The pressing need here is 
how to assist the above-mentioned four categories of people who play a role in the educational 
process of North American Muslims. 
 First, Muslim youth need to understand the relationship between the religio-ethical dimension 
of Islam and the secular-ethical 26 dimension of American society.   The nineteen-year-old boy in 
the case study above seems to have achieved this relationship when he stated that regardless of 
the rationale behind the prohibition of alcohol, the main issue is the criteria or values by which the 
individual measures his or her own behavior.   This variation in the criteria for decision making is 
the base of particularity within the pluralistic society.   The criteria should be understood only 
within the frame of reference (the Islamic worldview in this case) of the particular group to make 
sense of the behavioral manifestations among members of the same group (the Muslims of North 
America).   Otherwise, it could easily be misinterpreted as "fundamentalistic" or "ethnocentric" 
behavior. 
 Second, the individual Muslim learner--parent or youth--should become aware of the 
relationship between his or her own beliefs and the principles of the Islamic belief system.   This 
awareness may lead to understanding the philosophy of the discipline, Islam, and connect it to 
the learner's psychology in the new context, the Western vis-´a-vis the Muslim.   In the case study 
above, the fourteen-year-old girl was not able to make such a connection mainly because her 
frame of reference was not the Islamic but the secular Western philosophy and view of education, 
which emphasizes the utility of values and individual responsibility for the consequences of one's 
action (for example, it can be dangerous to drink and drive).  Though the fourteen-year-old girl's 
psychological makeup seems to have been formed within the Islamic faith, she deviates from the 
Islamic worldview because she only understands the Islamic prohibition of alcohol by relating to 
the immediate consequences of drinking.   Therefore, her "consequences" argument seems to be 
a Westernization of Islam, and she was not able to relate the psychology of the Islamic faith to 
the central concept of the Islamic belief system as a whole (the One God, who provides the 
principles and concepts about human life and the norms that guide it).   This inability to relate the 
psychology to the philosophy of a belief system (or the epistemology of a piece of knowledge) 
results in viewing the Islamic rule of prohibiting alcohol as similar to the Western rule that sets the 
drinking age.   In public schools the main objective of teaching about the dangers of drinking and 
driving is to prevent harmful consequences.   Both Islamic and Western rules of alcohol drinking, 
however, are perceived as similar by the fourteen-year-old girl because they both form a base for 
avoiding harmful consequences.   Yet, this young girl does not realize that harmful 
consequences, as viewed in the Islamic philosophy, extend beyond drinking age and drinking 
and driving.   This perception may eventually lead this fourteen-year-old, as it has led some other 
Muslims, to rationalize that drinking a toast is not a violation of an Islamic tenet -- the complete 
prohibition of alcohol because it is a directive of God who is the most knowledgeable about 
alcohol's effects on the mental ability).   This kind of rationalization is due to two shortcomings in 
the process of educating this young girl: the parents' inability to explain Islamic principles in the 
new context, and the inequitable access in the educational system to meaningful learning within 
particular and multiple perspectives. 
 Third, teachers or educators should realize the relationship between their own conceptual 
ecology and that of the learner within the various cultural, social, and ecological settings.   The 
father of the two siblings in the case study above, for instance, may protest that teachers lack 
sensitivity toward Islamic culture.   He may protest not because of the teachers' prejudice or their 
exclusion of "proper" instructional materials on Islamic culture/heritage but because of the 
teachers' inability to realize that their conceptual ecology differs from that of students such as his 
own children.   This problem does not belong mainly to the teachers, nor is it exclusive to Muslim 
parents.   Rather, it is a problem in the educational system as a whole because teachers are not 
trained to recognize these differences, in addition to their poor knowledge of Islamic culture and 
of other cultures.   This marginalization of the Islamic culture produces sketchy understanding 
and often misconceptions about Islam and Muslims' behavior.   As a result, teachers focus on 
behavioral expositions (social adjustment) as the lead factor in evaluating learning instead of 
focusing on creating meaning (conceptual adjustment) 27 and self-realization and actualization of 
the learner. 
 Fourth, the "experts" (whether Muslim community members or specialists in Islamic area 
studies) should realize how the applications of concepts within the Islamic system become 
transformed in space and time.   Orientalists who study Islam as a religion, meaning faith and 
rituals, may not be able to appreciate the subtle discrepancy between the rationales of the 
nineteen-year-old boy and his fourteen-year-old sister.   The same could be true for Muslim 
"experts" who do not understand the Western philosophy of secularism and of education and its 
fundamental difference from the Islamic philosophy.   These Muslim "experts" cannot realize that 
the mere teaching of Islamic history and principles to the next generation of Muslims will not 
necessarily produce an Islamic worldview in the Western, secular context.   Even when Islam is 
taught in Muslim schools that have different environments from that of the larger society, the 
general philosophy of the rest of (non-religious) curriculum is imbedded in Western secular 
assumptions.   Thus, meanings of Islam and Islamic history and culture become modified in the 
new context. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE LEARNING PROCESS IN A PLURALISTIC SETTING 
 The case in point of North American Muslims examines issues of pluralistic education for the 
particular group and gives a broader understanding of the North American cultural needs.   It 
symbolizes the central educational issues of pluralism.   The Islamic worldview is only one of the 
"different" worldviews to be accommodated in North American education, such as other Eastern 
cultures represented by Hinduism and Buddhism. 
 If we, as educators, do not understand the effect and the variation in the frame of reference--
the worldview of the learner--we have failed to provide meaningful learning for all pupils, and not 
only for those of the non-mainstream cultural groups.   Our inability to give meaning to schooling 
appears to be the core of the problem of American education, particularly during the last three 
decades.   Educators, especially those of us who are in the position of effecting policies and 
trends, have failed to modify our philosophical paradigms, the goals of education, and the 
curricular and instructional objectives so as to take into consideration the diverse social, 
anthropological, and conceptual needs of the society.   These needs (the awareness--felt or 
recognized--of belonging to a group related to a conceptual, territorial, linguistic, economic, 
ethnic, religious, cultural, and political historical or mythical past) have been, at best, 
marginalized. 
 From the "mainstream" cultural viewpoint, as educators we have, in the name of pluralism, 
slid into accepting plural expressions of ideas, thinking that this is the way to celebrate 
differences.   Yet we have failed to realize that we accept these expressions only when they 
conform to one set of ideas and within the frame of reference that is considered "standard" or the 
"norm." 
 As specialized professionals we have set the educational paradigm by reversing the order of 
priorities in public education, ignoring communities' input, and disregarding social and conceptual 
needs.   Regardless of what we call this single frame of reference, "Western," "American melting 
pot," or the "American milieu," and regardless of the individuals, this frame of reference has 
become solidified and more dogmatic.   This solidification calls for a change because the existing 
paradigm has lost its ability to provide lasting solutions the society as a whole currently faces. 
 Classroom implications of the above analysis represent only one complementary step to this 
article.   Future work, by this or any other author, need to explore community-based curricular 
and instructional design, teacher and administrator in-service-training, and textbook writing.  
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